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ABSTRACT
Deep learning models are widely used in a range of application
areas, such as computer vision, computer security, etc. However,
deep learning models are vulnerable to Adversarial Examples (AEs),
carefully crafted samples to deceive those models. Recent studies
have introduced new adversarial attack methods, but, to the best of
our knowledge, none provided guaranteed quality for the crafted
examples as part of their creation, beyond simple quality measures
such as Misclassification Rate (MR). In this paper, we incorporate
Image Quality Assessment (IQA) metrics into the design and gener-
ation process of AEs. We propose an evolutionary-based single- and
multi-objective optimization approaches that generate AEs with
high misclassification rate and explicitly improve the quality, thus
indistinguishability, of the samples, while perturbing only a limited
number of pixels. In particular, several IQA metrics, including edge
analysis, Fourier analysis, and feature descriptors, are leveraged
into the process of generating AEs. Unique characteristics of the
evolutionary-based algorithm enable us to simultaneously optimize
the misclassification rate and the IQA metrics of the AEs. In order
to evaluate the performance of the proposed method, we conduct
intensive experiments on different well-known benchmark datasets
(MNIST, CIFAR, GTSRB, and Open Image Dataset V5), while con-
sidering various objective optimization configurations. The results
obtained from our experiments, when compared with the exist-
ing attack methods, validate our initial hypothesis that the use of
IQA metrics within generation process of AEs can substantially
improve their quality, while maintaining high misclassification rate.
Finally, transferability and human perception studies are provided,
demonstrating acceptable performance.
1 INTRODUCTION
The increasing use of deep learning networks incentivizes adver-
saries to manipulate those networks such that the model outputs
their desired output, e.g., misclassification. In particular, recent
works at the intersection of machine learning and security have
shown that adversaries can force deep learning models to pro-
duce adversary-selected outputs through Adversarial Examples
(AEs) [1, 2]. AEs threaten the security of critical ML and DL appli-
cations, since miscreants could utilize them for malicious purposes,
such as misleading autonomous driving vehicles [3–5], hijacking
voice controlled intelligent agents [6, 7], evading deep learning-
based malware detection systems [8–10], etc.
AEs are created by adding a small perturbation to the original
input of the ML algorithm in order to produce the adversary’s de-
sired outputs [11]. Since the crafted AEs are generated by applying
limited changes to the original inputs, they are very similar to the
original ones, and are not necessarily outside of the training data
manifold. Ideally, algorithms crafting AEs need to minimize the
perturbation, thus making AEs hard to distinguish from legitimate
samples. As these attacks occur after the training is completed,
there is no need to tamper with the training procedures. Recently,
several adversarial generation algorithms have been presented,
including the fast gradient sign method [12], the Jacobian-based
saliency map approach [1], the virtual adversarial method [13], the
Carlini and Wanger (C&W) method [14], the NewtonFool [15], and
the Projected Gradient Descent (PGD) [16], among others.
To evaluate the performance of the AEs’ methods, the research
community explored various assessment metrics. The misclassifi-
cation rate, as a result of fooling the learning model, is commonly
used [12]. Another widely used metric is the similarity between the
generated AE and the original sample. For example, the average
distortion introduced by the algorithm is used as a metric for sim-
ilarity. Moreover, the human perceptibility was considered as an
assessment metric [1]. Others [15] investigated the quality of the
generated samples using various generator models. However, they
had no control over the quality metrics of the generated examples
within the process of crafting the AEs. Moreover, although these
metrics are used to assess the AEs, incorporating Image Quality
Assessment (IQA) metrics into AEs’ generation to produce high-
quality AEs is, surprisingly, missing from the literature. It is noted
that such IQA metrics can be utilized as a protection mechanism
against adversarial attacks, specifically in image related DL model
such as face spoofing [17], whereby AEs with lower quality are
detected and discarded. Therefore, for successful attacks, the gen-
erated AEs should be of high quality, in terms of IQA metrics, in
order to remain indistinguishable using those IQA metrics.
Why IQA Metrics. Image visual perception (approximated by L2-
norm [14]) is different from image quality assessment metrics. In
automated image recognition in a self-driving cars’ control sys-
tems, for example, the human perception-based visual quality plays
very little role in determining actions, and decisions are based on
quality metrics: poor quality images will be rejected as a possible
input. Moreover, generating AEs with high IQA metrics, such as
edges, HOG descriptors, etc., for images that include those used
in automated AI-based setting (e.g., traffic signs) have significant
implications, and where other approaches that provide lower IQA
metrics may fail, an approach that ensures misclassification while
maintaining a high IQA metrics may succeed in fooling those auto-
mated detection tools, challenging the robustness of such systems.
Contributions. To address the aforementioned gap, we propose
FAQ (False and Quality), an approach to produce high-quality AEs
in terms of IQA metrics with the following concrete contributions.
1) We propose FAQwhich leverages image qualitymetrics, such
as edge analysis, FFT analysis and HOG feature descriptors,
into the AE generation process. Unlike other existing ap-
proaches, FAQ enables control over multiple characteristics
of the generated AEs, such as brightness, global shape, etc.,
leading to AEs that are very similar to the original images.
2) To address the scalability of AE generation, we devise an ap-
proach in which we perturb only a limited number of pixels
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in the candidate image while achieving high misclassifica-
tion rate. For the selected pixels we search for an optimal
value of the perturbations through an evolutionary-based
multi-objective optimization algorithm, which is sufficient
to achieve high misclassification rate while producing high-
quality AEs in terms of IQA metrics.
3) We evaluate the performance of FAQ through intensive ex-
periments on four different benchmarks, namely MNIST
hand-written digits, Fashion MNIST, CIFAR-10, and GTSRB
(and a high resolution dataset). A comparison of the ob-
tained results from different configurations of FAQ with that
of popular AE methods confirm the effectiveness of FAQ in
generating high quality AEs.
Organization. Section 2 provides a brief background on quality
metrics. Section 3 describes our evolutionary-based approach for
generating high-quality AEs and configurations. Section 4 describes
the performance evaluation through various multi-objective quality
metric configurations, as well as the results and discussion. Section 5
describes the related work, followed by conclusions in Section 6.
2 BACKGROUND AND PRELIMINARIES
To ensure AE’s quality by design, we incorporate IQA metrics
and evolutionary-based optimization algorithms in the process
for generating AEs. To set out, we first describe the background
necessary for understanding those techniques. We need saliency
maps to analyze the sensitivity of model output to its input features,
described in Section 2.2. Three popular quality metrics used in our
analysis are described in the three subsequent sections: Canny edge
analysis in Section 2.3, fast Fourier transform analysis in Section 2.4,
and histogram of oriented gradient in Section 2.5. The particle
swarm optimization algorithm is described in Section 2.6.
2.1 Threat Model
In adversarial learning, the main goal of the adversary is to produce
an input sample x ′ such that it is misclassified by the model f .
Attacks on deep learning networks can be categorized frommultiple
perspectives, including the adversary’s goal and capabilities. Based
on the orientation of the attacker the attack can be either targeted or
untargeted, and based on his knowledge about the model the attack
can be either black- or white-box attacks [18, 19]. In this study, we
assume that the adversary has full knowledge of the topology of
the model, the link weights, etc. In addition, it is assumed that the
adversary is trying to conduct untargeted misclassification attacks.
A brief categorization of the adversarial attacks on deep learning
networks is provided in Appendix A.
2.2 Sensitivity Analysis
The Jacobian-based Saliency Map Approach (JSMA), due to Paper-
not et al. [1], produce AEs and force the model to classify the input
AEs as a specific class. The intuition of the adversarial saliency map
is to find features that, once modified, would have the most impact
on the output of the ML/DL-based classifier. Thus, such pixels are
used by adversaries to perform source-targeted attacks. One advan-
tage of this map is achieving misclassification while distorting a
small number of pixels. For example, perturbing 32 pixels leads to
≈ 97% misclassification rate for targeted-misclassification on the
MNIST hand-written digits dataset [1].
For a DL model F , the saliency map is defined based on the
forward derivative of the model. In (1), we compute the saliency
score for each pixel of a given image where perturbing highly
scored pixels is more likely to yield a desired output. Note that the
adversary desires to misclassify a given input sample to a target
class other than the original one; i.e., increasing the probability of
a target class t while decreasing the probability of all others. This
task can be performed by increasing the value of the salient pixels,
computed using the following saliency map S(I , t):
S(I , t)[i] =
{
0 i f Jit < 0 or
∑
j,t Jit (I ) > 0
Jit (I )
∑j,t Jit (I ) otherwise . (1)
In (1), i denotes the pixels of a given image I , while Jit (I ) shows
JF [i, j] (I ) = ∂Fj (I )∂Xi . In summary, pixels with high value of S (I , t) [i]
correspond to pixels that increasing their value would result in
increasing the probability of target class, or reducing the probability
of the other classes, or both cases. We refer the interested readers
to [1] for more information.
2.3 Canny Edge Detection
In the image processing and computer-vision communities, an edge
is defined as a set of curved line segments, composed of pixels, at
which brightness of the image changes drastically. Thus, edges con-
tain valuable structural information about properties of the given
image, and have been used in many computer-vision applications,
specifically in the areas of local feature detection. Edges in an image
may correspond to the following changes: 1) depth discontinuity, 2)
surface orientation discontinuity, 3) changes in material properties,
and 4) changes in the illumination of the scene.
There are several edge detectionmethods, such as theCanny Edge
Detector (CED) [20] and Deriche Edge Detector (DED) [21]. In this
work, we used CED as a metric to evaluate and compare the total
number of edges in the original images versus crafted AEs. CED, a
well-known edge detector, fulfills the following requirements: 1)
closeness of real and detected edges, 2) no duplicated detection of a
given edge, and 3) low false positive rate. A high-level architecture
of the CED algorithm is shown in Fig. 14. The steps that CED takes
to detect edges, including noise reduction, computing the intensity
gradient, non-maximum suppression, and hysteresis thresholding
are described in detail in Appendix A.
2.4 Fast Fourier Transform
In signal processing, analyzing signals in the frequency domain
offers more information than analyzing them in temporal or spec-
tral domains. Spectral analysis is a well-known statistical method
to transform signals into frequency domain. The intuition behind
spectral analysis is that each waveform is composed of the sum
of sine waves with different phase relationships, amplitudes, and
frequencies [22, 23]. There are various mathematical transforms
converting signals into spectra, and Fourier transform is a promi-
nent method for transforming signals into frequency domain.
In our analysis we used 2D FFT to analyze the quality of gen-
erated AEs. Spectra on two dimensional spatial frequency domain
can be achieved through Fourier transform on two dimensional
spatial domain. Representative information of features of an image
would be provided, as these spectra represent the periodic struc-
tures across positions in space. Particularly, rough shape structure
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(a) MNIST-digits (b) Fashion MNIST (c) CIFAR-10 (d) GTSRB (e) Open Image
Figure 1: A sample saliency map for each benchmark dataset using associated trained CNN model: Fig. 1(a) MNIST hand-written digits,
Fig. 1(b) Fashion MNIST, Fig. 1(c) CIFAR-10, Fig. 1(d) GTSRB, and Fig. 1(e) Open Image datasets. Pixels with large saliency score have
significant impact on the model output, thus are potential pixels to be perturbed.
of a given image matches the low spatial frequency, while detailed
features such as edges and illuminations can be represented by
spectra on high spatial frequency parts. The 2D Fourier transform
is briefly described in Appendix A.
2.5 Histogram of Oriented Gradient
In the computer-vision community, feature descriptors are widely
used to identify important regions of a given image. The Histogram
of Oriented Gradient (HOG) is a popular feature descriptor used
to detect objects in an image, primarily for pedestrian detection
in static images [24]. The intuition behind HOG is to describe ap-
pearance and shape of local object in a given image using intensity
gradient distribution or direction of the edges, even without ac-
curate information regarding the location of the edges. HOG is a
popular method to detect objects, and offers the following proper-
ties: 1) invariant to geometric transformations, 2) fine orientation
sampling, 4) coarse spatial sampling, and 4) local normalization. Ap-
pendix A provides more details on the main steps of the HOG de-
scriptor, consisting of gradient computation, orientation binning,
block normalization, and object orientation.
2.6 Particle Swarm Optimization
The Particle SwarmOptimization (PSO) algorithm is an evolutionary-
based optimizationmethod proposed by Eberhart and Kennedy [25],
and is inspired by the behavior of a group of particles, such as birds,
fish, or people. Similar to other population-based optimization algo-
rithms, the PSO algorithm comprises a set of individuals, known as
swarm particles, using their information about potential answers
for an optimization task in a given multidimensional search space.
Swarm particles’ position determines a potential solution for the
optimization problem at hand. The PSO algorithm searches for bet-
ter positions that provide better fitness evaluation in each iteration.
Each particles will have a specific fitness value with regard to its
position. Thus, the particles will move to positions in the search
space that give better fitness values. This movement takes place
with specific velocity for each particle and in repeated iterations,
and continues until the optimum solution with the highest fitness
value is obtained. The value of velocity is updated in each iteration
based on the particles’ previous position and that of neighbors [26].
The velocity of each individual in the search space is determined
by both its own and its companions’ [27]. In the N -dimensional
search space each individual is considered as a volume-less parti-
cle. The ith particle at time step t can be represented as xi (t) =
(xi1 (t) ,xi2 (t) , . . . ,xiN (t)). The ith particle’s best previous posi-
tion is recorded and represented aspi = (pi1,pi2, . . . ,piN ). The best
global particle achieving the best objective values among all parti-
cles in the population is denoted byдbest . Themovement velocity of
a particle at a time step is represented asvi (t) = (vi1 (t) ,vi2 (t) , ...,viN (t)).
The velocity and position of particles are updated in each search
iteration based on [25, 27]:
ν
(t )
id = wiν
(t−1)
in + c1r1
(
p
(t−1)
in − x
(t−1)
in
)
+ c2r2
(
p
(t−1)
дn − x (t−1)in
)
, (2)
x
(t )
in = x
(t−1)
in + ν
(t )
in (3)
where n is the dimension; 1 ≤ n ≤ N , c1 and c2 are positive
constants, r1 and r2 are two random functions in the range [0 1],
and w is the inertia weight. For the neighborhood lbest model,
the only change is to substitute pln for pдn in the equation for
velocity (2). This equation in the global model is used to compute a
particle’s new velocity with regard to not only its previous velocity
and the distance of its own best experience pbest from the current
position but also the group’s best experience дbest [25].
One of the key advantages of particle swarm optimization algo-
rithm is its simplicity, since it requires only a few parameters to be
adjusted. The general structure of PSO algorithm is shown in Fig. 2.
Further information about PSO algorithm can be found in [25, 27].
3 GENERATING EXAMPLES WITH HIGH IQA
Applying small changes to the input data is a common step among
several methods that generate AEs. However, different definitions
have been proposed for small changes, including the average dis-
tortion introduced by the algorithm and the number of distorted
pixels. Thus, it would be desirable if an algorithm can produce AEs
by not only applying perturbations with a small size but also by
changing a small number of pixels, instead of a whole feature space.
Note that not all regions from the input domain contribute to the
AEs [1]. To this end, in this study we sort the pixels based on their
saliency score and restrict the number of pixels to be perturbed to
less than ≈ 10%. Moreover, we leverage the IQA metrics within the
process of crafting AEs to control their quality.
First, features with a significant impact on the decision bound-
aries of the DL network are extracted and sorted in a decreasing
order. Then, we attempt to generate AEs that force the DL-based
model into misclassification, by applying an optimal value of per-
turbation into only the top n features, while maintaining similar
IQA metrics to the original sample. To set out, two different con-
figurations, with and without quality metrics, are designed: the
3
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importing original image I
finding n top salient pixels
initializing PSO parameters
generating initial population
of crafted samples
evaluating the objective
function of crafted samples
finding global best
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and (9))
end
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No
Fig. 4. High-level structure of evolutionary-based method for crafting AEs.
and without considering quality metrics, to generate adversarial
samples. These configurations can be categorized into Single-
Objective Configuration (SOC), Two-Objective Configuration
(TOC), and Comprehensive Configuration (CC). The primary
goal of SOC configuration is generating AEs that is crafted
through applying optimal size of perturbation into n top salient
pixels, where none of IQA metrics are considered in the AE
generation process. Note that unlike [11] we do not set the
value into one; however, we find the optimal value of the
pixels using PSO algorithm. In TOC and CC configurations
we do consider IQA metrics within the AE creation process.
The difference between TOC and CC configuration is number
of the IQA metrics leveraged into the process, while TOC
considers only one IQA metric, CC considers all three IQA
metrics simultaneously.
The evolutionary based optimization algorithms, unlike
gradient-based methods, are less likely to trap the search in a
local minima. Therefore, we have utilized the PSO algorithm
to generate adversarial examples with optimal perturbation
size. A general flowchart of the proposed evolutionary based
approach for generating adversarial samples is shown in Fig. 4.
For every input image Iorg we analyze sensitivity of the
CNN model’s output to it’s input features using the saliency
map. These features are then sorted in a decreasing order
using their saliency score. Pixels with a large saliency score
have more impact on the output of the model, subsequently
their modification may lead to misclassification. We apply
perturbation only on the first n features since they have most
impact on the output of the deep learning model.
In the rest of this section we provide more details of the
different configurations of the proposed approach. We present
SOC approach in IV-A. Then we present TOC approach
in IV-B, where we describe three different TOC approaches,
including edge-based TOC IV-B1, FFT-based TOC IV-B2,
and HOG-based TOC Section IV-B3. Finally, we present CC
approach in IV-C, where all of the three IQA metrics along
with misclassification rate are optimized simultaneously.
A. Single-Objective Configuration
The main effort in this section is to generate AEs by
applying optimal perturbations into the original image I such
that the model output f(xadv) is labeled different class from
original output f(x). This strategy is called SOC, as there is
only one main objective, which is misclassification. In order to
evaluate our method, we used misclassification rate as a num-
ber of adversarial samples that successfully could force deep
learning model to misclassification (targeted-misclassification
in the case of JSMA) divided by total number of attacked
samples. The taken steps to craft adversarial samples using
SOO method are elaborated in Algorithm 1. It should be
noticed that the results of this section necessarily does not
guarantee the quality of the generated adversarial examples.
More specifically, the following are three main questions we
aim to answer:
1) Can we generate AEs through distorting a small
number of features, instead of whole feature space?
2) What is the average size of the distortion introduced
by different adversarial attack algorithms?
3) How does misclassification rate relate to the number
of perturbed features?
Algorithm 1: Generating adversarial samples based on
single objective optimization. We select the global best
sample among successfully crafted samples as final out-
put of the algorithm, adversarial sample.
1 Function SOO (Iorg, Np, maxIter, F );
Input : Iorg , Np, maxIter, F
Output: Iadv
2 lorg  argmaxF (Iorg)
3 calculate saliency score of Iorg (based on (1))
4 select pixels associated with n top scores
5 initialize PSO parameters
6 generate initial population of crafted samples (Iadv) by adding
random perturbation to selected n pixels
7 ladv  argmaxF (Iadv)
8 if lorg 6= ladv then
9 O = kIorg   Iadvk
10 evaluate the objective O of all crafted samples
11 Gbest  global best sample
12 if Termination criteria is satisfied then
13 return Gbest
14 else
15 generate new population of crafted samples (based
on (8) and (9))
16 go to 7
17 end
18 else
19 generate new population of crafted samples
20 go to 7
21 end
B. Two-Objective Configuration
The main effort in crafting adversarial samples Iadv is to
craft AEs that are very similar to the original input Iorg, such
that they cannot be perceived by human eyes. Although, several
research works have considered the number of distorted pixels
or the difference in the L2-norm between Iorg and Iadv as a
metric for indistinguishability of produced AEs [25], to the
best of our knowledge, there is no research that incorporates
IQA metrics into the process of generating adversarial samples.
It should be noticed that there is difference between assessing
the IQA metrics of the produced samples, as it is performed
Figure 2: High-level structur f FAQ.
Single-Objective Optimizat (SOO) and the Multi-Objective Opti-
mization (MOO) configuration. The goal of SOO is to enerate AEs
by applying an optimal size of perturbation into the top n salient
pixels, where none of the IQA metrics are considered in the AE
generation process. MOO configuration takes into account the IQA
metrics within th AE crea ion proc ss.
Unlike [1], w do not set the value of the pixel to be perturbed
into one; rather, we utilize a evolutionary-based optimizationmethod
to find the optimal value of the perturbation to achieve misclassifica-
tion. FAQ benefits from an evolutionary-based search method, PSO
algorithm, to find an optimal value of the perturbations. Note that
evolu ionary-based search algorithms are less likely to be trapped
in a local minima, unlike gradient-based algorithms.
A flowch rt of FAQ is in Fig. 2. For every input image Iorд , we
analyze the sensitivity of the CNN mod l’s output to its input fea-
tures using the saliency map. These features are then sorted in
a decreasing order using their saliency score. Pixels with a large
saliency score have more impact on the output of the model, thus
their modification is more likely to lead to misclassification. In
the rest of this section, more detail information about the two
configurations of FAQ is provided. First, we present the SOO config-
uration in section 3.1 and then the MOO configuration is presented
in section 3.2.
3.1 Single-Objective Optimization (SOO)
In this secti , we show how to gen rate AEs by applyi g opti-
mal perturbations into the original image I such that the model
output f (xadv ) is labeled with a different class than the original
output f (x). In general, the SOO configuration aims to answer the
following three key questions: (1) Can w generate AEs through dis-
torting only mall numb r of pixels, instead of the whole feature
space? (2) What is the average size of the distortion introduced by
different adversarial alg rithms? (3) How does the misclassification
rate relate to the number of perturbed pixels?
To evaluate the SOO configurati n, we used the miscla sification
rate as the number of AEs that successfully force the learning model
to misclassification (targeted-misclassification in the case of JSMA)
divided by the total number of attacked samples. The taken steps to
craft AEs using the SOO configuration are shown in Algorithm 1;
for SOO, we use the weightswi=2:4 = 0 (no IQA metrics are used).
The SOO configuration is similar to other adversarial attack
algorithms, where the main goal is to achieve misclassification.
However, in SOO we try to achieve this goal by modifying only
a small number of pixels, instead of distorti g the whole feature
space. Note that we do not calculate forward derivatives in each
iteration as it is done in [1], which in turn increases the computation
time. Rather, we select the top n pixels once at the initial step and
stick with those pixels during t e rest of our SOO run, and conduct
our PSO search for the best perturb tion values of those pixels to
fulfills our goal. Note that our approach is also different from [1],
where in each iteration two top salient pixels’ values are set to
one until misclassification is achieved. Moreover, we focus on a
limited number of pixels, which were selected initially based on
the saliency map, and solve an evolutionary-based optimization
problem, consisting of n variables, to find the minimal values of
perturbations that lead to misclassification.
3.2 Multi-Objective Optimization (MOO)
The goal is to produce AE Iadv that is very similar to the original
input Iorд . Although several works have considered the number of
distorted pixels or the difference in the L2-norm between Iorд and
Iadv as metrics for indistinguishability of the produced AEs [15],
there is no work hat incorporates IQA metrics into the AE genera-
tion process. It should be noted that there is a difference between
assessing these quality metrics of the produced AEs, as it is per-
formed in [15], and taking into account these IQA metrics as part
of the objective function within the generation process: the former
only measures the IQA metrics of the crafted AE without any con-
trol over them, while the latter controls the quality of the generated
samples i terms of IQA metrics during the production process.
The MOO configuration is defined by adding an IQA metric into
the objective function of the SOO approach. Using MOO, we at-
tempt to generate AEs by distorting only a small number of pixels
while improving the quality of the generated AE in term of the
IQA metrics. Particularly, we try to answer the following questions:
(1) How can we incorporate the aforementioned IQA metrics into
the process of generating AEs? (2) How do these metrics impact
the misclassification rate and the quality of the crafted samples?
To answer both question , we incorporate the edge analysis,
FFT analysis, and HOG feature descriptors, into the objective to
be minimized simultaneously. Based on the MOO configuration,
AEs that offer lower IQA metrics yield larger objective values, thus
likely to be discarded within the AE creation process. Optimization
of these metrics at the same time will result in AEs that are close
to the original image in multiple aspects, such as brightness, global
shape, feature descriptors, etc. These objectives are described below.
Edge Analysi . Edge analysis is imp ant to detect points in a
give image at which the brightness of the image changes drasti-
cally. Edge analysis has been used in many computer-vision and im-
age processing applications, specifically for feature extraction [28].
Similarly, edge analysis can play a critical role in the context of
adversarial machine learning, as crafted AEs should offer similar
brightness properties to that of the original image. Therefore, the
difference between the number of detected edges in the adversarial
and in the original image is considered as a metric to be minimized.
FFT Analysis.We consider FFT analysis of the applied changes to
the original image as a quality metric. The FFT analysis provides
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valuable information about the characteristics of an image, e.g.,
global shape information and sharp changes. Thus, the FFT has
been widely applied to decompose an image into its sine and cosine
components, and as a feature in image recognition tasks. The FFT
analysis can play an important role in the context of adversarial
learning, since it reveals valuable perturbation information. In this
work, we considered the L2-norm difference of the perturbation’s
two dimensional FFT, O3 =
FFT 2 (Iorд − Iadv ), as a metric to
be minimized. A smaller value of this metric corresponds to less
feature distortion due to the introduced perturbation.
HOG Analysis. Using HOG analysis we aim to produce AEs with
highMR and similar feature descriptors to that of the original image.
In this work, we considered the L2-norm difference of HOG feature
descriptors of the adversarial sample Hadv and the original image
Hadv , as a metric to be minimized; O4 =
Horд − Hadv .
Algorithm 1 shows how to produce AEs while incorporating the
three IQA metrics, by taking Iorд , Np ,w1,w2,w3,w4,maxIter , and
F as inputs, calculating the saliency of the input features, gener-
ating the initial population of the crafted samples, calculating the
value of each quality metric—including edges O2, FFT analysis O3,
and HOG feature descriptor O4—and evaluating the final objective
function Of , which is a weighted linear combination of these ob-
jective Of =
∑4
i=1wiOi , where O1 is the objective corresponding
to misclassification rate, while O2, O3, and O4 are objectives corre-
sponding to the aforementioned IQA metrics. Similarly,w1,w2,w3,
andw4 are associated weights with the related objective functions.
The algorithm iterates until it meets the termination.
4 EXPERIMENTS AND EVALUATION
To demonstrate our method, we conducted an extensive set of
experiments using benchmarks outlined in Section 4.1. Moreover,
we compared the results obtained from the proposed approach with
that of various adversarial attack methods, listed in Section 4.2. In
Section 4.3, we describe the implementation of the different aspects
of our approach, including the deep model architecture, particle
swarm optimization algorithm, attack methods, and the quality
metrics. The main results and a discussion are in Section 4.4. A
human perception study is outlined in Section 4.5, followed by
transferability analysis in section 4.6, and detection in 4.7
4.1 Main Datasets
We used multiple popular image classification benchmarks, includ-
ing MNIST hand-written digits [29], Fashion MNIST [30], CIFAR-
10 [31], GTSRB [32], and Open Image V5 [33], by Google AI, to
evaluate the performance of our approach. A brief description of
these datasets are provided in below. Note that in all of our experi-
ments we consider only the samples that were classified correctly
by the DL model for the AE generation.
MNIST-Digits. The Mixed National Institute of Standards and
Technology (MNIST) hand-written digits benchmark is a set of
labeled gray-scale images consisting of 50K training samples and
test set of 10K samples. The images are normalized, centered, and
have a fixed size of 28x28 pixels. Each image is labeled as {0, ..., 9}.
MNIST-Digits is a popular database for image recognition tasks [29].
FashionMNIST. The Fashion MNIST benchmark is a set of labeled
gray-scale images consisting of 60K training samples and a test set
of 10K samples. The images are normalized, centered and have a
Algorithm 1: A sample algorithm for generating AEs based
on FAQ. Here we consider all of the three IQA metrics within
the process to optimize the quality of the generated AEs.
1 Function CC (Iorд, Np, wi=1:4, maxI ter, F );
Input : Iorд , Np , w1, w2,maxI ter , F
Output : Iadv
2 Lorд ← argmaxF (Iorд )
3 Eorд ← CED(Iorд )
4 Horд ← HOG(Iorд )
5 calculate saliency score of Iorд (based on (1))
6 select pixels associated with n top scores
7 initialize PSO parameters
8 generate initial population of crafted samples (Iadv ) by adding
random perturbation to selected n pixels
9 Ladv ← argmaxF (Iadv )
10 Eadv ← CED(Iadv )
11 Hadv ← HOG(Iadv )
12 if Lorд , Ladv then
13 O1 =
Iorд − Iadv 
14 O2 =
Eorд − Eadv 
15 O3 =
F FT 2(Iorд − Iadv )
16 O4 =
Horд − Hadv 
17 Of =
∑4
i=1wiOi
18 evaluate the objective Of of all crafted samples
19 Gbest ← global best sample
20 if Termination criteria is satisfied then
21 return Gbest
22 else
23 generate new population of crafted samples (based on (2)
and (3))
24 go to 7
25 end
26 else
27 generate new population of crafted samples
28 go to 7
29 end
fixed size of 28x28 pixels. Each image is labeled as {0, ..., 9}. Fashion
MNIST is popular for image processing and classification tasks [30].
CIFAR-10. The Canadian Institute For Advanced Research (CIFAR-
10) dataset is a subset of 80M tiny images. It consists of 60K low-
resolution 32x32 images in 10 different classes, including cars, birds,
cats, dogs, frogs, horses, and trucks. CIFAR-10 dataset is widely used
in machine learning and computer vision classification tasks [31].
GTSRB-10. The German Traffic Sign Recognition Benchmark (GT-
SRB) [32] is a popular multi-class classification dataset. GTSRB has
more than 39K training images of various sizes, and more than 12K
test images. The images are very similar to real-life data, with 43
different traffic signs. Accurate traffic sign recognition is essential
for autonomous vehicles, specifically for self-driving cars.
Open Image. In order to understand the impact of the image reso-
lution on the performance of FAQ and other methods, we conducted
several experiments using the aforementioned attack methods on a
CNN model trained over the Open Image Dataset V5 [33]; a large
dataset by Google AI containing more than 8.9M high resolution
images covering almost 20K class labels. To set out our experiments
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and considering multiple factors such as time constraints and compa-
rability with other utilized benchmarks in this study, we conducted
our experiments on a set of 10 class labels, selected at random.
4.2 AE Generation Methods
For a better perspective on the performance of FAQ, we compared
our results with state-of-the-art adversarial attack methods. We
chose five generic algorithms already published and well-known in
the community, including the Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM),
due to Goodfellow et al. [12], Jacobian-based Saliency Map Ap-
proach (JSMA), due to Papernot et al. [1] C&W, due to Carlini and
Wagner [14], Projected Gradient Descent (PGD), due to Madry et
al. [34], and Momentum Iterative Method (MIM), due to Dong et
al. [35]. We briefly describe these methods in Appendix A, and refer
the interested reader to original presenting sources.
4.3 Main Experimental Setup
We built deep learning models based on the CNN architecture
trained over the benchmarks in Section 4.1. The trained models is
considered as as baseline when generating AEs. Next, we incorpo-
rate the PSO algorithm along with the IQA metrics to produce AEs
as outlined in Section 3. In this section, we outline the implementa-
tion of our proposed approach in detail.
Evaluation system. Experiments are conducted using Python
3.6.0 run over Ubuntu 16.04 using a system with an I5-8500 CPU @
3.00 GHz, with 32 GB DDR4 of RAM, 512 GB SSD for storage, as
well as NVIDIA Titan RTX, RTX 2080Ti, and GTX 980Ti (GPUs).
Model Architecture. The CNN we used in our experiments has
multiple consecutive convolutional layers with ReLu activation, fol-
lowed by a fully connected layer outputting softmax values for each
class. We tested different values for the number of convolutional lay-
ers, batch size, and epochs to improve accuracy rate of the trained
networks over the aforementioned datasets. We achieved 99.12%
and 98.94% accuracy rate for the MNIST hand-written digits and
Fashion MNIST test datasets, respectively, after 50-epochs training
and batch size of 150 with three convolutional layers. Moreover, we
trained two more CNN models on CIFAR-10 and GTSRB datasets
with six convolutional layers, which achieved a detection accuracy
rate of 86.61% and 92.24% on the test samples, respectively. Further
details about CNNs can be found in [36].
Canny Edge Detector. For edge analysis, we used CED implemen-
tation from scikit-image [37]. The algorithm uses a 2D grayscale
image I , the standard deviation value σ of a Gaussian filter, and
values of lower and higher thresholds as inputs, and provides the
binary edge map of the given image as an output. The performance
of CED is highly dependent on three main parameters: σ , tlow , and
thiдh . In our experiments, we considered σ = 2, tlow = 0.6 and
thiдh = 0.8. Note that proper values of tlow and thiдh should be
determined empirically.
Fast Fourier Transform. The 2D discrete Fourier transform al-
lows mapping images onto their spatial frequencies domain, con-
sequently analyzing the perturbations with regard to their spatial
frequencies, where a high frequency corresponds to details of the
features and sharp changes in the values while lower frequencies
provide information about the global shape. Because well-designed
AEs are expected not to change the global shape, we include lower
spatial frequencies in our analysis. We argue that if the global shape
of the image remains unaffected they should result in similar lower
spatial frequencies. However, if the perturbation affects the general
shape, then discarding this part of the frequencies would lead to
loss of critical information. Therefore, in this study we consider
the L2-norm difference of the perturbation’s FFT as a metric to
evaluate the quality of the AEs. The smaller the L2-norm difference,
the higher the quality of the AEs.
Histogram of Oriented Gradient. To compute the HOG feature
descriptor vector of a given image we used the HOG function pro-
vided by scikit-image [38]. The algorithm takes as an input the
image I , the number of orientations, number of pixels per cell, num-
ber of cells per block, and the normalization method, and calculates
the HOG feature descriptor vector. In our experiments we consid-
ered 9 channels in each histogram, cell size of 8 × 8 pixels, block
size of 2 × 2 cells, and L2-norm normalization method to calculate
the HOG feature descriptor of a given image.
Attacks.We used the Cleverhans [39] library for the implementa-
tion of FGSM, C&W, MIM, PGD, and JSMA. Cleverhans is a Python
library for conducting adversarial attacks and building defenses on
machine/deep learning systems.
Particle SwarmOptimization & Configuration. There are mul-
tiple convergence topologies in the literature, e.g. ring, star, etc. In
this study, we used the ring topology where particles are connected
with their neighbors. Star topology performs better in the local best
scenario of the PSO. Note that both local best and global best sce-
narios of the PSO are similar in the sense that the social component
of the velocity updates causes both to move towards the global best
particle. However, as the local best scenario is less susceptible to
being trapped in local minima and performs better, we used it in
this study. In order to deal with the velocity explosion problem, we
used the clamping technique. The performance of the PSO algo-
rithm depends on suitable selection of the parameters’ values and
their adjustment along the search process. In the PSO algorithm,
the number of particles Np and the maximum total number of it-
erationsmaxIter play a key role in the optimization process and
are generally problem-dependent. Proper values of PSO parameters
can lead to better convergence, fewer iterations, shorter running
time, and better balance between local and global search. In our
experiments, we set the number of swarms to be Np = 300 and
the maximum number of iterations to bemaxIter = 200. While the
values of c1 and c2 were set empirically, c1 + c2 ⩽ 4, r1 and r2 are
random numbers drawn from a uniformly distributed in the range
of [0 1], to maintain the diversity of the population.
4.4 Main Results and Discussion
We considered two different configurations in our experiments,
namely SOO and MOO configurations. We considered several con-
straints in our experiments, such as perturbing a very small number
of the pixels (at most 30—out of 784 pixels—in MNIST datasets, 70
pixels in CIFAR-10, 90 pixels in GTSRB, and 400 pixels in Open
Image dataset), high misclassification rate of generated AEs, and
improving the quality of the generated AEs in terms of IQA met-
rics. To overcome these constraints, we first use the saliency map
algorithm introduced in [1] to rank pixels based on their saliency
score. The saliency map of a given input image for different datasets
are shown in Fig. 1. Larger values of saliency score correspond to
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pixels with high impact on the model output. Thus, we argue that
perturbing those pixels would likely lead to misclassification.
Fig. 3–Fig. 7 show sample AEs generated for the five different
benchmarks—MNIST hand-written digits, Fashion MNIST, CIFAR-
10, GTSRB, and Open Image—using various attack methods.
4.4.1 SOO Configuration. In order to find the minimal value
of pixels to be perturbed, we conducted several experiments using
different values of n, and selected the one that leads to higher
misclassification rate. For example, as it is shown in Fig. 8, the
distortion of 90 pixels on Fashion MNIST dataset can definitely lead
to 100%misclassification rate, without further need to perturb more
pixels. Note that the selected pixels are not identical across images,
as their saliency score pattern might be different depending on the
nature of the image. For instance, on MNIST datasets the saliency
score at the center of the image is higher, as the main object (digits,
fashion items) are located at the center of the image. However, the
saliency score of images from CIFAR-10 and Open Image datasets
are more distributed across the image. Several experiments are
conducted on other benchmarks and we found that FAQ is able to
achieve reasonable misclassification rates by perturbing only 5.22%,
7.21, 7.28%, and 9.11% of pixels, on average, in MNIST hand-written
digits, CIFAR-10, GTSRB, and Open Image datasets, respectively.
Note that this is promising, as an adversary does not need to distort
a large number of pixels to achieve his/her goal. At the same time,
this implies that the decision of DL model is mostly contingent
upon those salient pixels, while other pixels have smaller impact.
It should be noted that in the SOO configuration of FAQ we do not
consider any of the IQA metrics, and the only objective is achieving
a higher misclassification rate. In other words, the generated AEs
do not necessarily offer good quality metrics.
In order to provide better insight and comparison between our
SOO approach and other existing AE generation methods, where all
of them have only one goal; that is achieving misclassification, the
obtained results are presented categorically and based on bench-
marks, as follows: MNIST digits, Fashion MNIST, CIFAR-10, GTSRB,
and Open Image all in Table 1. As it can be seen from these tables,
the proposed SOO approach not only is able achieve a reasonable
misclassification rate through distortion of only a small propor-
tion of pixels but also produces AEs with better IQA metrics, in
comparison to the existing adversarial attack methods. In the case
of Fashion MNIST dataset, for example, we are able to achieve a
misclassification rate of 100% while perturbing only 36.9 pixels
(4.71% of all pixels), on average. Moreover, all other metrics, such as
IQA (HOG metric=0.66, FFT metric=82.5, and Edge diff=1.49) and
L2 distance between the AE and original image (2.89) is better than
that of other adversarial attack methods.
4.4.2 MOO Configuration. Unlike SOO, where the goal was to
achieve misclassification, the main goal of MOO is to improve all
three aforementioned IQA metrics of the AEs at the same time,
while perturbing only small proportion of pixels. The results show
that our MOO approach is able to improve all IQA metrics simul-
taneously, while maintaining the misclassification rate relatively
high. It should be noted that in this configuration we consider a
weighted linear combination of four different objectives as a final
objective function that the optimizer, the PSO algorithm, attempts
to optimize. The results for different datasets are shown in Table 2,
Table 1: Results for various adversarial attack methods with the
SOO configurations and four benchmark datasets. In those exper-
iments, we use W1=1, and W2=W3=W4=0. The results clearly
demonstrate that traditional methods offer poor IQA features.
MNIST hand-written digits dataset
App. Pixels Pert. Edge FFT HOGI_Org. I_Adv. Diff.
FGSM 59.2 34.6
77.34
77.10 6.80 175.84 1.54
MIM 54.4 20.2 76.67 3.09 111.66 1.18
PGD 77.2 23.3 77.27 2.76 121.51 1.24
C&W 82.1 6.3 76.91 2.88 107.11 1.19
JSMA 4.1 4.50 79.33 3.83 110.39 1.02
Evol. 5.45 3.76 78.91 2.13 102.23 0.72
Fashion MNIST dataset
App. Pixels Pert. Edge FFT HOGI_Org. I_Adv. Diff.
FGSM 76.7 28.8
65.4
71.4 7.88 192.93 1.55
MIM 72.8 17.1 68.68 4.71 127.68 1.39
PGD 81.9 13.3 67.53 4.48 102.51 1.28
C&W 88.9 11.23 67.37 4.26 129.11 1.26
JSMA 4.3 4.95 67.12 2.47 107.35 0.97
Evol. 4.7 2.89 66.71 1.49 82.5 0.66
CIFAR-10 dataset
App. Pixels Pert. Edge FFT HOGI_Org. I_Adv. Diff.
FGSM 98.3 11.4
89.8
100.1 15.06 230.35 2.58
MIM 80.6 3.1 93.57 5.49 81.5 1.84
PGD 96.4 4.6 94.71 7.45 84.88 1.95
C&W 97.9 8.9 96.02 9.48 127.9 2.04
JSMA 6.6 2.9 94.43 7.65 79.79 1.78
Evol. 7.21 3.1 92.35 5.06 56.24 1.53
GTSRB dataset
App. Pixels Pert. Edge FFT HOGI_Org. I_Adv. Diff.
FGSM 96.8 19.5
95.23
141.01 48.88 230.36 2.87
MIM 88.8 11.4 119.19 28.35 150.16 2.66
PGD 95.4 5.8 105.08 14.89 85.37 2.32
C&W 96.8 6.77 104.13 13.08 82.41 2.04
JSMA 7.6 3.67 102.35 9.20 100.24 2.39
Evol. 7.28 3.34 97.56 3.45 42.36 1.48
Open Image dataset
App. Pixels Pert. Edge FFT HOGI_Org. I_Adv. Diff.
FGSM 98.8 20.69
347.9
403.01 60.18 801.69 5.18
MIM 97.4 4.18 350.33 13.94 246.43 3.43
PGD 98.2 9.05 355.90 23.53 364.46 4.20
C&W 98.3 8.01 354.01 21.05 320.07 3.72
JSMA 2.59 12.10 354.26 13.31 157.94 1.94
Evol. 2.75 3.76 350.10 3.24 112.36 1.86
where it can be observed that while the misclassification rate re-
mains high, all of the IQA metrics are improved in comparison with
traditional adversarial attack methods as well as SOO approach
(see Table 1 for all benchmarks). This means that the MOO con-
figuration is able to successfully fulfill all of the aforementioned
objectives, with smaller L2 distance, and improving several IQA
metrics. It should be noted that improving one quality metric in
MOO might affect other metrics, as the final objective function is a
combination of multiple unique objectives, thus the final result is a
compromise among all objectives.
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Figure 3: Sample AEs generated for MNIST hand-written digits (untargeted attack). Our approach generates AEs by perturbing only 30
out of 784 pixels in a given image, while maintaining close IQA metrics to the original input.
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Figure 4: Sample AEs generated for fashion MNIST dataset. Our approach produces a misclassification rate of more than 97.40 by perturbing
3.82% of the pixels in a given greyscale image on average while showing high IQA metrics.
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Figure 5: AEs generated for CIFAR-10 using several adversarial attack methods. The adversary can force the DL model to misclassification
only by perturbing small proportion of the image, while maintaining very close to the original image in terms of IQA metrics.
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Figure 6: Sample AEs generated for GTSRB benchmark, where the FAQ outperforms existing methods in terms of IQA metrics while
perturbing only 8.72% of pixels in a given image on average.
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Figure 7: Sample AEs generated for high resolution images from the Open Image Dataset V5 [33] dataset using various adversarial attack
methods. Our approach is able to generate AEs with better IQA metrics in comparison with other approaches.
Our results show that FAQ is able to offer a significant improve-
ment in the IQAmetrics of the AEs as well as L2 distance, regardless
of the images’ resolution, and with only a small misclassification
rate degradation with high resolution images, while perturbing
limited number of pixels. The misclassification rate degradation
is reasonable as we have selected only a small number of pixels
with high saliency score. However, per Section 4.4.1 and Fig. 1, the
saliency score pattern of the images differs based on their content.
For instance, for the Open Image dataset the saliency score pattern
is distributed and its value for pixels remain close to each other,
which means that more pixels have a significant effect on the deci-
sion of the model. Thus, it is required to perturb larger number of
pixels to achieve misclassification.
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Figure 8: No. of perturbed pix-
els effect on AE’s misclassification
rate using FashionMNIST dataset.
Figure 9:Misclassification rate of
various adversarial attack meth-
ods on different benchmarks.
Figure 10: Human perception.
GTSRB’s results are due to users’
lack of knowledge on road signs.
Figure 11: Transferability using
various adversarial attack meth-
ods and benchmarks.
Table 2: Results when the MOO configuration on various bench-
marks with W1=0.4 and W2=W3=W4=0.2. We observe that all IQA
metrics are improved, compared to the SOO configuration and other
adversarial attack approaches.
App. Pixels Pert. Edge FFT HOG% I_Org. I_Adv. Diff.
Digits 5.4 3.5 77.3 78.7 1.4 99.8 0.7
Fashion 4.7 2.9 65.4 66.4 1.4 82.1 0.6
CIFAR-10 7.2 3.2 89.8 91.8 3.3 36.2 1.1
GTSRB 8.0 3.7 95.2 96.1 1.3 42.3 1.4
Open Image 6.34 3.90 347.9 349.1 1.6 107.3 1.5
4.5 Human Perception Study
Adversarial examples need to be both misclassified by the deep
learning model and classified correctly by humans. To test the latter
requirement, we conducted an IRB-approved human perception
study on the generated AEs employing 70 participants. To do so,
we presented 10 samples from each of our datasets and asked if
they can interpret the image, if so, we further asked them to label
the image by selecting a potential label from provided bag of labels.
Participants demographic information. 57.14% and 40% of the
participants identified as male and female, respectively, while the
rest wished not to identify as either. The participants’ age range was
between 15 and 35, with 80% of them between 20 and 30 years old.
While a majority of the participants had a high level of education,
only a small number of them were familiar with the concept of
adversarial machine learning (23.80% in total). Due to the lack of
space, detailed demographic information, such as gender, age, and
education level are delegated to Appendix A, Fig. 13.
Results. To understand the effect of AEs on human perception we
selected samples from four benchmarks, 10 AEs from each, covering
a wide range of subjects, e.g. digits, fashion, road signs, etc. As
it is demonstrated in Fig. 10, participants were able to interpret
samples at a rate of 95.9%, 91.9%, 96.0%, and 85.1% for CIFAR-10,
Fashion MNIST, MNIST-Digits, and GTSRB datasets, respectively.
Moreover, the participants were able to identify the correct label
of the AEs with a success rate of 94.4%, 88.8%, 92.5%, and 73.6%
for CIFAR-10, Fashion MNIST, MNIST-Digits, and GTSRB datasets,
respectively.We note that the lower rate of the GTSRB dataset is due
to the participants’ lack of technical knowledge of traffic road signs.
Moreover, we found that 16 individuals, out of 70, did not finish
the GTSRB section of the experiment, whose feedback was “this
section is confusing and I don’t have technical knowledge about those
signs” and “the number of labels is very large (43)”. Nevertheless,
these results demonstrate that the generated AEs maintain human
recognizablity, while being misclassified by the DL model.
4.6 AE Transferability
In order to investigate the transferability of the generated AEs we
conducted several experiments on several benchmarks covering a
wide range of domains, including digits, fashion, road signs, etc..
The findings of our experiments were in line with that of the theo-
retical work concerning the transferability of features and crafted
AEs across different structures of deep networks [18, 40, 41]. In
particular, we found that FAQ offers better transferability proper-
ties in comparison with the PGD and C&W methods when using
all of the benchmarks, as shown in Fig. 11. It should be noted that
although the transferability rate of the FGSM and MIM approaches
are higher than FAQ’s, their IQA metrics are far below that of the
FAQ’s as shown in Figure 11.
We also investigated the impact of the number of perturbed pix-
els on various characteristics of the AEs, including transferability
and IQA metrics. Our analyses demonstrate that there is a positive
correlation between the number of perturbed pixels and transfer-
ability. For example, for CIFAR-10 dataset the transferability rate
increases from 41% to 72% while perturbing 60 and 300 pixels, re-
spectively Fig. 12(c), and the same pattern is shown with other
benchmarks as well. Moreover, we observed that the IQA metrics
of the AEs have a negative correlation with all of the IQA metrics,
which is undesired. Note that this negative correlation is also an-
ticipated, as the more distortion by modifying more pixels the less
quality we get. In other words, transferability of AEs can be boosted
at the cost of AEs with smaller IQA metrics Fig. 12.
4.7 Defense: Detectability of FAQ
A final concern is how FAQ affects the detectability of AEs. We note
the number of modified pixels, distance (between an original and
AE), and human perception are possible detection features. More-
over, as shown in this work, we note that the number of modified
pixels in our work is smaller than in the literature, leading to a
smaller distance between an original image and the corresponding
AE than state-of-the-art. As a result, we conclude that our approach
would bypass even a smaller threshold of detection when using
those features, as compared to the literature.
A unique feature of FAQ is explicitly optimizing for IQA met-
rics. While the prior work tries to obtain good IQA scores, that is
only implicitly, by calculating the IQA of the AEs without any con-
trol over the quality in the generation process. As a result, and as
demonstrated in this work, FAQ would bypass a detection method
that utilizes IQA metrics even with a smaller threshold, where other
competing approaches would fail. However, for both categories of
features, a small threshold should be utilized to detect our AEs.
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(a) MNIST-Digits (b) Fashion MNIST (c) CIFAR-10 (d) GTSRB
Figure 12: The impact of the number of perturbed pixels on various characteristics of the AEs transferability and IQA metrics. While there
is a positive correlation between transferability and number of perturbed pixels, the correlation is negative between IQA metrics.
5 RELATEDWORK
Security assessment of machine learning networks [42] is an evolv-
ing research area in both the security and machine learning com-
munities with a range of attack categories, adversarial capabilities,
and defense considerations [43, 44]. Biggio et al. studied the secu-
rity of pattern classifiers at the design phase and under attack [45].
They proposed an empirical framework to evaluate the security of
machine learning models. However, their work considers simple
binary classification models, such as LR and SVM, and not deep
learning models, such as DNN or CNN.
Categorization. Adversarial machine learning can be categorized
based on the attack type and model type. Attacks against machine
learning models can be divided into three main categories: train-
ing phase attack [12, 46], where the training set is poisoned, test
phase attack [47], where AEs are generated to fool the model, and
model theft [18], where model parameters are extracted. Adversar-
ial machine learning models are also two main categories: white
box models [1, 15, 47], where the adversary has a complete access
to the machine learning model and associated parameters, and the
black box models [18], where the adversary has oracle access and
no prior information about the model itself.
Gradient-based approach. AEs generation was developed using
simple methods based on the back-propagation approach used for
network parameter training [12, 40, 48]. In this approach, the AEs
are generated by determining an optimization problem using the
deep learning model’s cost function. Specifically, gradients are cal-
culated to update the input, rather than the deep learning network
parameters. These inputs are then used to fool the deep learning
model. For example, Goodfellow et al. presented a fast gradient
sign method to generate AEs [12]. Moosavi-Dezfooli et al. intro-
duced DeepFool to generate universal perturbations while being
able to find small directions and being fast [2]. Similarly, Jang et
al. presented a simple gradient-descent based algorithm, called
Newtonfool, to find AEs with high performance [15].
Transferability. Szegedy et al. showed that AEs generated to fool
a given neural network model are likely to be misclassified using
other models [40]. This property, called transferability, enables ad-
versaries to generate AEs and conduct a misclassification attack
on a machine learning system even when he has no access to the
underlying model [18]. Furthermore, Yosinki et al. studied the trans-
ferability of features among different deep neural networks [41].
Quality Metrics. In most research works the misclassification rate
is considered as the evaluation metric [12] along with human per-
ceptibility [1]. Jang et al. leveraged a few image quality metrics from
the computer-vision community to assess the quality of crafted sam-
ples [15]. However, they did not incorporate those quality metrics
in the process of generating AEs, thus had no control over the qual-
ity of the crafted AEs. This is, the approach does not necessarily
guarantee high IQA metrics, and rather assess those metrics once
the samples are generated. However, we consider the IQA metrics
within along with misclassification rate for optimization.
6 CONCLUSION
We proposed FAQ, an approach to generate AEs with high misclassi-
fication rate while maintaining high-quality in terms of IQAmetrics.
Those metrics provide significant information, such as brightness
properties, about the image. We incorporated edge analysis, Fourier
analysis, and feature descriptor into the process of generating AEs
to control the quality of the crafted examples within the generation
process. In order to obtain high IQA metrics and misclassification
rate, we devised a multi-objective particle swarm optimization al-
gorithm. To evaluate the performance of FAQ we have conducted
several experiments through different configurations of quality met-
rics on several benchmarks. A comparison of the results obtained
from FAQ with several well-known methods shows that FAQ is
able to improve the quality of the AEs in terms of multiple IQA
metrics. For instance, we are able to achieve misclassification rate
of 100% when distorting only 36.9 pixels, on average, which leads to
L2 distance of 2.94, edge difference of 1.37, FFT of 82.12, and HOG
feature descriptor metric of 0.63 in the Fashion MNIST benchmark.
Our human perception study shows that human subjects were able
to easily detect the AEs, with high identification and interpretation
rates (as labeled), while transferrability of the AEs was competitive,
in comparison with the prior work, and even better than some
competing approaches. We found that we could also increase the
transferrability rate by increasing the number of perturbed pixels,
although at the cost of IQA metrics.
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A APPENDIX
A.1 Human Perception Study: Demographics
Among our participants, 57.14% and 40% identified as male and
female, respectively, while the rest wished not to identify with
either category. The participants’ age range was between 15 and
35, with 80% of them between 20 30 years old. While a majority of
the participants had high level of education, only a small number
of them were familiar with the concept of adversarial machine
learning (23.80% in total) Fig. 13.
A.2 Canny Edge Detection
This section describes the five steps that CED takes to detect edges,
including noise reduction, computing the intensity gradient, non-
maximum suppression, and hysteresis thresholding.
Preprocessing. Images may contain noise that can easily affect the
performance of the edge detector, requiring some noise reduction
techniques to improve the stability of the edge detector and prevent
false detection. Typically, a Gaussian filter is applied on a given
image for noise reduction. A Gaussian filter with kernel size of
(2k + 1) × (2k + 1) is defined as:
G(x ,y) = 1
2πσ 2
exp
(
−(x−(k+1))2+(y−(k+1))2/2σ 2
)
,
where 1 ≤ x ,y ≤ (2k + 1) and σ represents the standard deviation
of the Gaussian distribution. Note that the performance of the CED
is dependent on the proper selection of k and σ . For instance, a
larger kernel size reduces the sensitivity of CED into noise, while
increasing the localization error of the CED.
Computing the intensity gradient. Once the given image is
smoothed using a Gaussian filter, CED convolves the blurred image
with two 3 × 3 Sobel kernels to find the gradient of the image in
horizontal Gx and vertical Gy directions as in (5). Note that ∗ is
a convolution operator, which adds each pixel of an image to its
neighbor pixels, weighted by the kernel. For instance, for a given
image I the convolution of a kernel f with sizem×n and data value
d of a pixel at locations corresponding to the kernel are defined as:
c =
©­«
m∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
fi, jdi, j
ª®¬ /s
 . (4)
Here c represents the output pixel value, while s represents the sum
of the coefficients of the kernel.
For a given image I and its gradient images, Gx and Gy , which
contain the horizontal and vertical derivative approximations, de-
fined as:
Gx =

1 0 −1
2 0 −2
1 0 −1
 ∗ I , Gy =

1 2 1
0 0 0
−1 −2 −1
 ∗ I , (5)
we compute the magnitude G and direction θ of the gradients of
each pixel as:
G =
√
G2x +G
2
y , θ = atan
(
Gy
Gx
)
, (6)
where ∗ denotes the 2D convolution operation. The found edge
directions θ are rounded to 0°, 90°, 45°, or 135°, corresponding to
horizontal, vertical, and diagonal directions, respectively.
Non-maximum suppression. It is desired to detect thin and clear
edges with no duplicated detection of a given edge. Thus, CED takes
an edge thinning step, called the Non-Maximum Suppression (NMS)
technique, to provide an accurate response to the edge. NMS sets all
the gradient values to zero except the locations with local maxima
values. To this end, CED moves a 3× 3 window over the magnitude
and direction of the gradients of the image and sets the magnitude
of the central pixel to zero if its gradient value is smaller than the
gradient value of two neighbors in the rounded gradient direction
θ . In particular, CED selects the central pixel of the window as an
edge if its gradient value is as follows. (1) If θ = 0°, the gradient
value of the pixels in west and east directions. (2) If θ = 45°, the
gradient value of the pixels in south west and north east directions.
(3) If θ = 90°, the gradient value of the pixels in south and north
directions. (4) If θ = 135°, the gradient value of the pixels in south
east and north west directions.
Hysteresis thresholding. The output of the NMS step would dis-
card less accurate edges, while preserving edges close to real edges
in a given image. However, factors such as color variation result
in spurious edge responses, and weak gradient magnitude. These
pixels should be filtered out, while pixels with strong gradient mag-
nitude should be preserved. CED performs this task by considering
two threshold values, higher threshold thiдh and lower threshold
tlow . This approach defines strong edges as edges with gradient
magnitude larger than thiдh , while edges with magnitude smaller
than thiдh and larger than tlow are considered weak edges. Finally,
the values smaller than tlow are considered non-edge and are set
to zero.
In order to evaluate the validity of weak edges, CED tracks edge
connections through hysteresis analysis. A weak edge is consid-
ered a valid edge only if it is connected to one strong edge, while
invalid weak edges will be suppressed. The intuition behind this
technique is that edges produced by noise or color variations are
not connected, whereas a weak edge caused by a true edge would be
connected into a strong edge. The performance of CED is highly de-
pendent on the value of higher threshold thiдh and lower threshold
tlow . Moreover, the values of these two thresholds are dependent
on the content of the input image, thus their value should be em-
pirically defined.
A.3 Fast Fourier Transform
In this section we briefly describe two dimensional Fourier trans-
form as it is an operation on spatial domain where an image lies.
Considering a two-dimensional integrable function f of x and y
variables, the Fourier transform F on u and v spatial frequencies in
x and y directions can be written as:
F (u,v) =
∫ ∞
−∞
∫ ∞
−∞
f (x ,y) exp−2π i(ux+vy) dxdy. (7)
Note that (7) is defined for continuous spatial domain, whereas
images are discrete values. Thus, a discrete form of (7) on discrete
two dimensional (2D) domain is defined in (8), known as the discrete
Fourier transform, and has been used in many applications [22].
Namely, the discrete Fourier transform F of a given image I can
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(a) Gender (b) Age Group (c) Education Level (d) Familiarity with AML
Figure 13: General demographic information of the participants. In total, we asked 70 individuals, with wide range of background in terms
of age, education level, and familiarity with the concept of adversarial machine learning. The majority of the participants were in the age
range of 20 to 30 years old Fig. 13(b), while with higher level education Fig. 13(c), were not familiar or had some familiarity with the concept
of AML Fig. 13(d).
grayscale image I
G(x, y) = 12piσ2 exp
(
− (x−(k+1))2+(y−(k+1))22σ2
)
Gx =
1 0 −12 0 −2
1 0 −1
 ∗ I Gy =
 1 2 10 0 0
−1 −2 −1
 ∗ I
G =
√
G2x +G
2
y θ = atan
(
Gy
Gx
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θ = 90 →
south and north
θ = 135 →
s. east and n. west
Higher threshold
thigh
Lower threshold
tlow
Edge map
Gaussian filter
Sobel YSobel X
DirectionMagnitude GyGx
Non-max suppression
Hyst. thresholding
Figure 1: High-level flowchart of the Canny Edge Detection (CED) algorithm.
The performance of the CED depends on the kernel size of the Gaussian filter
and the value of upper thigh and lower tlow thresholds.
1
Figure 14:High-level flowchart of the Canny Edge Detection (CED)
algorithm. The performance of the CED depends on the kernel size
of the Gaussian filter and the value of upper thiдh and lower tlow
thresholds.
be achieved by considering f as a function of intensity on (x ,y)
spatial domains:
F (k, l) =
m−1∑
x=0
n−1∑
y=0
f (x ,y) exp−2π i(kx/m+ly/n), (8)
wherem andn represent image dimensions, while k and l are spatial
frequencies in x andy directions. Note that the size of both intensity
function on spatial domain f (x ,y) and frequency domain F (k, l)
are the same, matrices of m × n. The discrete Fourier transform
can be computed using Fast Fourier Transform (FFT), an efficient
algorithms with time complexity of O(n log n). More details about
2D FFT are in [22, 23].
A.4 Histogram of Oriented Gradient
Computing the gradient. The first step in HOG is to compute
the magnitude and direction of the gradient for each pixel of a
given image I . This can be achieved using a one dimensional point
derivative mask on the horizontal Gx and vertical Gy directions as
follows:
Gx =
[−1 0 1] ∗ I , Gy = 
−1
0
1
 ∗ I . (9)
Notice that ∗ represents the convolution operator as defined in (4).
Then, the magnitudeG and direction θ of the gradients of each pixel
can be calculated using (6), used for CED in Section 2.3. We note
that no preprocessing steps, e.g., image smoothing, are required
for HOG descriptor as it performs better without smoothing [24].
In addition, the HOG descriptor, unlike CED, does not round the
direction θ to preserve more information for next steps.
Orientation binning. The next step is to divide image into small
sub-images, called cells, consisting of pixels, e.g. 8 × 8. Every pixel
inside the cell makes a weighted vote, based on the gradient values
computed on previous step, for an orientation-based histogram
channel. Once the histogram of each cell is computed, the his-
tograms are assigned to certain histogram channel. Each histogram
has multiple channels equally spread over 0°to 180°, e.g, nine chan-
nels corresponding to 0°, 20°,. . . , 160°. Contribution of each pixel
would be calculated based on the magnitude of the gradient.
Descriptor blocks. In order to prevent the effect of local illumi-
nation and contrast on the magnitude of the gradients, every his-
togram needs to be normalized locally. Thus, the HOG descriptor
groups multiple cells, e.g., 2 × 2, in larger blocks, where the his-
togram normalization takes place.
Normalization. As mentioned in the previous section, the HOG
descriptor applies normalization to blocks consisting of several his-
tograms to eliminate the impact of local illumination and contrasts
13
input image I
Gx =
[−1 0 1] ∗ I Gy = [−1 0 1]T ∗ I
G =
√
G2x +G
2
y θ = atan
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Gy
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channels
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f√
‖f‖22+e2
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DirectionMagnitude GyGx
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Feature normalization
Figure 1: High-level flowchart of the Histogram of Oriented Gradient (HOG)
feature descriptor algorithm.
1
Figure 15: High-level flowchart of the Histogram of Oriented Gra-
dient (HOG) feature descriptor algorithm.
on the performance of the descriptor. There are several different
techniques for block normalization, including L1 and L2 normaliza-
tion, among others. However, except the L1 normalization method,
the choice of normalization rarely impacts the overall performance
of the HOG descriptor [24]. For example, L2 normalization of non-
normalized histograms in a block can be defined as:
v =
f√
| | f | |22 + e2
,
where f represents a non-normalized feature vector of all his-
tograms in a block, | | f | |22 shows L2-norm, e is a small constant, and
v is the normalized feature vector.
A.5 Adversarial Attacks on Deep Learning
A brief description of these adversarial attack categories assumed
in our threat model is provided below.
Targeted attacks. The focus of this attack is to generate AE x ′ that
forces the classifier f to misclassify into a specific target class t . For
instance, the adversary generates a set of malicious IoT software
samples, which are classified as benign. That is: x ′ : [f (x ′) =
t] ∧ [∆ (x ,x ′) ≤ ϵ], where f (.) represents the classifierâĂŹs output,
∆ (x ,x ′) denotes the difference between x and the crafted AE x ′,
whereas ϵ is a distortion threshold.
Untargeted attacks. The focus of untargeted attack is to generate
an AE that forces the classifier f to misclassify to any class other
than the original class f (x), where x is the original input. That
is: x ′ : [f (x ′) , f (x)] ∧ [∆ (x ,x ′) ≤ ϵ], where f (.) shows the
classifier’s output, ∆ (x ,x ′) represents the difference between x and
x ′, and ϵ is the distortion threshold.
White-box attacks. In this attacks, the adversary has full access
to the model and complete knowledge of its network topology
and all links weights. Accordingly, the adversary can carry out
an unlimited number of queries to the model until a successful
adversarial example is ultimately generated [1, 14, 49, 50]. With the
prior knowledge of the model internals, the adversary has a high
chance in generating AE with small perturbation, which increases
both the success rate and the effort required to detect the crafted
AEs [51].
Black-box attacks. In this attack, the adversary has no prior
knowledge of the model internals. Here, the adversary has ora-
cle access to the model, enabling him to conduct queries to the
model [49, 52]. Two main approaches are followed in the black-
box attacks: reverse-engineering the decision boundaries of the
network [52] or querying intermediate AEs and improving the gen-
erated AE iteratively [49]. Therefore, this type of attack requires
enormous number of quires to the model and achieves a relatively
lower misclassification rate [49].
A.6 Adversarial Attack Methods
In order to demonstrate the performance of the proposed method,
the obtained results are compared with those of popular existing
adversarial attack methods. In the following a brief description of
these attacks are provided.
A.6.1 Fast Gradient Sign Method. FGSM is designed to gener-
ate AEs in a fast matter, while not guaranteeing similarity of the
generated examples compared to the original samples[53]. It per-
forms based on one-step gradient update, which can be expressed
using (10) as following:
δ = ϵ · siдn (∇x Jθ (x , l)) (10)
where, δ is the perturbation parameter, ϵ is a small scalar value
that limits the distortion of the image and sets the magnitude of
the perturbation. In addition, siдn(.) denotes the sign function, J (.)
is the cost function, where x is the input image and l is the label
associated with it, and ∇ computes the gradient of the cost function
J around current value of x . Finally, the output image is can be
represented using (11).
x ′ = x − δ (11)
Here, x ′ is the adversarial example corresponding to image x . Con-
trolling the distortion parameter ϵ will affect the L2 norm distance
between the original and the AEs. The higher ϵ value is, the larger
L2 distance. For visualization, the x ′ values is clapped to suits 0-255
one channel scale [54].
A.6.2 Carlini & Wagner Method. Carlini and Wagner [14] in-
troduced three gradient based attacks by optimizing the penalty
and distance metrics on L∞, L2, and L0 norms as shown in the
equation (12) below:
min | |δ | |2p s .t . д (x + δ ) = y∗ & x + δ ∈ X (12)
where, δ is the perturbation parameter, д(.) is the objective function
based on hinge loss,y∗ is the targeted class and x is the input image.
This equation ensures that added perturbation will be small and
only as required to misclassify to class y∗.
A small modification can be made to launch non-targeted attacks
as shown in equation (13) below:
min | |δ | |2p s .t . д (x + δ ) , y & x + δ ∈ X (13)
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In this paper, we will focus on L2 based C&W attack to generate
AEs. L2 distance represents the required amount of changes into
the application binaries to generate the adversary example, lower
L2 distance indicates lower altering in application binaries. The
perturbation δ is defined as the following in equation (14).
δ =
1
2 (tanh (w) + 1) − x . (14)
where tanh(.) is hyperbolic tangent function, w is an auxiliary
variable optimized in equation (15).
min
w
| | 12 (tanh (w) + 1) | |2 + c · д
(
1
2 (tanh (w) + 1)
)
(15)
where c is a constant. C&Wmethodminimizes the Lp norm distance
between the generated adversary example and original image to
increase the similarity and harden the detection process.
A.6.3 Momentum IterativeMethod. Momentum iterativemethod
(MIM) is based on applying momentum gradient over basic FGSM
to generate AEs [35], the main goal is to maintain efficiency against
black box models. The main object for this method is to find x∗
that misclassify the model that satisfy the equation (16) where J is
the loss function, and ϵ is small scalar that control the maximum
distortion allowed.
arдmax
x ∗
J
(
x∗,y
)
, s .t . | |x∗ − x | |∞ ≤ ϵ (16)
The momentum gradient then calculated using (17).
дt+1 = µдt +
∇x Jθ
(
x ′t , l
)
| |∇x Jθ
(
x ′t , l
) | | (17)
where µ is the decay factor, x ′0 initially is the original input, and
д0 initially 0. Each iteration, x ′ will be updated according to this
equation:
x∗t+1 = x
∗
t + ϵ · siдn (дt + 1) (18)
after n number of iterations, the x ′t+1 will be returned as the adver-
sarial example for input x .
A.6.4 PGD Method. Madry et al. introduced iterative projected
gradient descent (PGD) attack [16]. The aim is to generate adver-
sarial sample under a minimized empirical risk with a trade of high
performance cost. The original empirical risk minimization (ERM)
for the model is referred in as the following notation:
E(x,y)∼D [L (x ,y,θ )] (19)
where L is the loss function. By modifying the definition of ERM
and allowing the adversary to perturb the input, s described in
equation (20), our goal is to minimize the risk while adding pertur-
bation.
min
θ
ρ (θ ) , where ρ (θ ) = E(x,y)∼D [max
δ ∈S
L (x + δ ,y,θ )] (20)
where δ is the perturbation, and ρ (θ ) is the objective function
to minimize. As an iterative method, x ′t+1 is updated each iteration
according to the previous x ′t and the generated perturbation, after
n iterations, x ′t+1 will be returned as the adversarial sample of x .
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